Andrew G. Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co. et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
Andrew G. Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling
Co. et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin, Richards, Mattson & Evans; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co., No. 8501 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2575
Case No. 8501 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW G. NOKES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CO~TINENTAL :MINING & MILL-
ING CO., a Corporation, E. G. FRA W-
LEY, President, JOHN DOE, Sec-
retary, GLEN I. CRANDALL, Trans-
fer Agent, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8501 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTH 
STATEMENT OF TI-IE FACTS 
This is an action to compel the defendant corpora-
tion, its officers or Transfer Agent to transfer a cer-
tificate of stock on the books of the corporation. The 
certificate in que·stion represented 100,000 shares of the 
common stock of the defendant Continental Mining and 
:Milling Company, a Nevada corporation. The certificate 
was made in the names of Lawrence & l\1ario 0. l\1igliac-
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cio (Plaintiff'·s Ex. 1, R. 29), and, being promotion stock, 
was deposited in 1950 with the Utah Securities Commis-
sion. The stock was released at the request of the plain-
tiff and over the objection of the defendant corporation 
by the Utah Commission on the 7th day of June, 1954 
(R. 51). The transfer of the stock was arranged for the 
specific purpose of defeating the corporation's rights 
and under such circumstances that dispel any notion of 
a transfer in good faith. The defendant corporation and 
defendant E. G. Frawley take this appeal. 
The sale of the stock was arranged by Thomas C. 
Cuthbert and John "\V. Lowe, attorneys licensed to prac-
tice before the Bar of this State (R. 46, 51). They were 
and now are the attorneys for the 1\:ligliaccios and had 
previously represented them in prolonged litigation 
against the defendant corporation and the defendant 
Frawley (R. 49). Cuthbert and Lowe were also close per-
sonal friends of the plaintiff to the extent that all con-
sidered a relationship of trust and confidence existed 
among them (R. -±-!,51). 
On the 7th of June, the date the rtah Commission 
released the certificate to the Migliaccios, Cuthbert and 
Lowe were present and represented Migliaccio, and had 
personal knowledge of the corporation's claim and all of 
the circtunstances surrounding the disputed stock and 
were 'advised ·that the corporation intended to institute 
an action to recover the certificate (R. 46, 51, 53). On 
the 11th day of June, four days later and five days prior 
to the sale to the plaintiff, the defendant corporation 
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filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division, wherein it claimed 
to be the owner of S'aid stock (Ex. 3, R. 42). 1vfr. Lowe 
knew that the action had been commenced ( R. 53). 
The sale of the stock was arranged on the 16th day 
of June, 1954, by a series of coincidences. On that day 
the plaintiff, a resident of I\::ansas, as good fortune 
would have it, was in the offices of Cuthbert and Lowe, 
apparently upon business for his former employer, 
Pioneer Pipe Line Company, which co:rnpany Cuthbert 
and Lowe represented (R. 34-35). Mr. Nokes had gone 
to law school with Cuthbert where their friendship be-
gan, .and on the 16th day of June, 1954, Mr. Nokes was 
an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah 
(R. 36, 44). He was employed, however, at that tirne by 
the Sinclair Pipe Line Company for a salary of about 
$500.00 per month (R. 42). Cuthbert knew Nokes was 
a novice and lacking in any knowledge about uraniun1 
stock (R. 45), except that he had heard there was money 
to be made in uranium stock (R. 35). 
vVhile the record discloses that Nokes was in tho 
office on matters relating to litigation involving the 
Pioneer Pipe Line Company, it does not appear that .any 
business was discussed except the sale of the stock. The 
suggestion that Nokes buy the stock and the price at 
which it could be purchased was made by Cuthbert and 
Lowe (R. 35-37). The benefits and the speculative possi-
bilities of the stock were discussed in detail (R. 38-45). 
As coincidence would have it Nokes was receptive to a 
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speculation and had $500.00 with which to indulge his 
n1ood (R. 35). Notwithstanding the fact that the stock 
was not traded, had no market value and required N oke~ 
to part with an entire rnonth's salary, there was abso-
lutely no sales resistance (R. 38-45). The conversations 
were held in Mr. Lowe~s office while all three were pre-
sent and their very good friend and fellow member at 
the Bar was induced to purchase the stock upon the re-
presentation that it had a book value of $7000.00 (R. 45). 
In view of the extemporaneous nature of the con-
versations about stock a further remarkable coincidence 
was at hand. The ~ligliaccios were residents of Price 
and, in spi1e of the fact that it took a "Gnited States 
Marshal from the 11th day of June u~til the 19th day of 
July to discover the whereabouts of ~Ir. and Mrs. :Jiig-
liaccio, .Jir. Cuthbert, hy means of a single telephone call, 
located Migliaccio in the ~ltlas Building in Salt L.ake 
City (R. 38-48). At this point favorable circumstances 
continued. Rather than call his client from Lowe's of-
fice by merely reaching out and picking up the telephone, 
.Jlr. Cuthbert left ~Ir. Lowe's office and, in the seclusion 
of his own office, had the following conversation with 
Migliaccio : 
·· 'So I called l\Iagliaccio on the telephone 
thereafter and told him that if he wanted 1noney 
I could get him $500.00 for this stock. 
M~agliaeeio said: 'Do you think it is a good 
de~al ?' 
I told hun we knew he had been fighting it 
out with Frawley sinee about 1950, that it was a 
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sure bet he wouldn't be ~able to do anything with 
that stock without liti~ation. If he sold the stock 
off maybe somebody else could do something with 
it without fighting it. So I told him on that basis 
it would be a good deal to get out of it because law-
suits would be costing more than the stock was 
worth.' " (R. 48). 
Upon con1pleting the conversation with Migliaccio 
Cuthbert returned to lvir. Lowe's office (R. 48). GooJ 
fortune continued on behalf of their very good friend Mr. 
Kokes because he w.as informed by Mr. Cuthbert that 
the S'ale had been arranged. Another remarkable circum-
stance then occurred. Mr. Cuthbert forgot to tell his 
very good friend all of the conversation he had with 
Migliaccio (R. 48). 
In about an hour's time all of these Inatters occurred 
.and Nokes hurried to 1neet :Migliaccio, turn over to him 
a month's salary, before deductions, and went to an of 
fice of the defendant Frawley to demand transfer (R. 
39). At this point the course of things changed. Fron1 
the facts it can hardly be said that the change was un-
exp~cted. On seeing :Mr. Frawley, Nokes' good fortune 
began to frown because, as he testified: "After he be-
labored me with invective he told 1ne he would not tranf-,-
fer the shares." (R. 40). Nokes then hurried back to 
the office of Cuthbert and Lowe and told them of the 
turn of events (R. 39). Thus, two hours after they had 
made their good friend $7000.00 on a $500.00 inveshnent, 
on stnck that wa(S not traded and was not worth the price 
of a lawsuit, Cuthbert and Lowe told Nokes that the de-
fendant corporation claimed the stock (R. 41-48). 
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Fortune continued to frown on Mr. Nokes because 
his request that his friends represent him in the matter 
was refused (R. 50). 
The defendant corporation thereafter continued to 
assert its rights and following the trial of the action filed 
in the Federal Court, Judge A. Sherman Christenson, 
on the 14th day of April, 1955, adjudicated that the cor-
poration was the owner of the stock. (Ex. 4, R. 42). 
The record discloses that the only demand for trans-
fer made was on ~Ir. Frawley. It does not show that the 
demand was made in the office of the Continental :Mining 
and 1\iilling Company or that the stock was sent to the 
Transfer Agent of the corporation for transfer (R. 31). 
The defendants contend that the plaintiff acquired 
nothing by the endorsement and, in any event, the plain-
tiff had notice of the defect and claim of the defendant 
corporation and that the sale was not n1ade in good 
faith. 
STATE1\IENT OF POIXTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE ADJUDICATION THAT 
THE CORPORATION \VAS THE OWNER AND DEFEND-
ANTS' PREDE·CESSORS HAD NO RIGHT. TITLE OR I~­
TEREST IN THE STOCK. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
DEFECT IN TITLE OF THE STOCK OR THAT THE SALE 
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IMPUTE 
NOTI·CE OF THE DEFECT. 
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POINT III. 
THE SALE WAS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. 
POINT IV. 
THAT BY STATUTE THE TRANSFER WAS NOT VALID 
AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION UNTIL IT WAS REG-
ISTERED UPON THE BOOKS OF THE CORPORATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE ADJUDICATION THAT 
THE CORPORATION WAS THE OWNER AND DEFEND-
ANTS' PREDECESSORS HAD NO RIGHT, TITLE OR IN-
TEREST IN THE STOCK. 
The position of the defendant is that the plaintiff 
is bound by the decree in Continental :Mining and :Milling 
Company, .a corporation, plaintiff, v. LaY·.Trne~· and 
Marie 0. ~iigliaccio, defendants, Civil C-85-54, 1 Tnited 
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division. In the case referred to the specific question be-
fore the court was the title and ownership of the cer-
tificate and the stock it represented. The same matter 
is directly in question in the present action. In such cases 
it has been held that the judgment of a court of concur-
rent jurisdiction is conclusive as between the parties and 
those in privity with the1n in estate or law. RluUheu·s 
v. Matthews et al., 102 Utah 428, 132 P. 2d 111: 
" 'The judgment of a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a ple.a, 
·a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same 
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parties, upon the same maJtter directly in question 
in another court.' 15 R.C.L. 951, Sec. 429. 
'The foundation principle upon which the doc-
trine of res judicata rests is that parties ought 
.not to be permitted to litigate the same issue 
more than once; that, when a right or fact has 
been judicially tried and determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such 
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, 
so long as it remains unreversed, should be con-
clusive upon the parties, and those in privity with 
them in law or estate. 
* * * Public policy and the interest of litigants 
alike require there be an end to litigation, .and 
the peace and order of society demand that mat-
ters distinctly put in issue and determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and 
subject matter shall not be retried between the 
same parties in any subsequent suit in any court.' 
15 R.C.L. 953, Sec. 430." (Emphasis added). 
While the plaintiff was named a party to the action 
after the defendant becmne aware of the transfer, he 
was never served with process. However, the plaintiff 
is in privity with the defendants therein, having suc-
ceeded to the s~une property and property rights. This 
court defined the word "priYity .. in relation to the doc-
trine of res judicata in Tauuer l'. Bacon., State Engineer, 
et al., 103 Utah 494, 136 P. :2d 957: 
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res 
judicata does not operate to affect str.angers to 
a judgn1ent: that it only affects the parties and 
their Rnccessors in interest, and those who are in 
privity with a party thereto. 30 Aln. Jur. 951, 
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Sec. 220; 34 C. J. 756 to 758, Section 1165; Glen 
Allen l\fining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 
Utah 362, .at 367, 296 P. 231; State Bank of Sevier 
County v. American Cement & Plaster Co., 80 
Utah 250, 10 P. 2d 1065; Tintic Indian Chief 
M:ining & Milling Co. v. Clyde, 79 Utah 337, 10 
P. 2d 932; Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 
P. 266, 55 A.L.R. 1032; Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 
473, 88 P. 609; 120 Am. St. Rep. 935. This 
court has defined the word 'privity' as 'a mutual 
or successive relationship to the same right or 
property. As .applied to judgments or decrees of 
courts, the word means one whose interest has 
been legally represented at the time.' Glen Allen 
l\1:ining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Cmnpany, 
supra (77 Utah 362, 296 P. 233)." 
The plaintiff herein could acquire only the title of 
his predecessors in interest .and nothing more. The ques-
tion of title was fully litigated and the plaintiff herein 
could offer no matter in support of his transferor's title 
nor impose any defense thereto. His interest was legally 
represented in the fullest sense of the word. The es-
sential and important element of privity is that one per-
son should succeed to the estate or interest formerly held 
by another. The definition of privity and the theory .are 
set forth in 1 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, 
Section 438, pages 959-961, as follows : 
"Privies in General. - 'Where one claims in 
privity with another, whether by blood, estate, or 
law, he is in the same situation with such person 
as to any judgment for or against him; for judg-
ments bind privies .as well as parties.' The rule is 
well settled and elementary that a judgment is 
as conclusive on privies as on the parties them-
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selves. 'The term ' 'privity' ' denotes mutual or 
successive relationship to the same rights of pro-
perty.' This relationship is produced either by 
operation of law, by descent, or by voluntary or 
involuntary transfers from one person to another. 
Hence privies have, from an early period in the 
history of the common law, been classified as, -
All privies are in effect, if not in name, priv-
ies in estate. They are bound because they have 
succeeded to some estate or interest which was 
bound in the hands of its former owner; and the 
extent of the estoppel, so far as the privy is con-
cerned, is limited to controversies affecting this 
estate or interest. The manner in which the estate 
was lawfully acquired neither linrits nor extends 
the operation of the estoppel created by a former 
adjudication, and is therefore immaterial. It is 
essential to privity, as the term is here used, that 
one person should have succeeded to an estate or 
interest forn1erly held by another." 
In the case herein Lhe cmnplaint in the rnited States 
District Court was filed on the 11th day of June, 195-±, 
and the transfer of the stock was on the 16th day of June, 
195-!, the defendant :Jligliaccio. however, was not served 
until Jnly 19, 195-!. In discussing privity· the sequence 
in which tlw ach; occurred are of ilnportanee. It has been 
held that when:> the transfer is prior to the conunence-
Inent of tht> .action there is no privity. but where the 
tnm~I'Pr is 1nade subsequent to the emmnencement of 
tl1t> adion there is privity and the part~~ is bound by the 
;jndgn1ent. The qtwstion as to when the action was com-
IIH'll<'Pd is also inlportant. The rtah Rules of Civil Pro-
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cedure provide that an action n1ay be commenced by the 
filing of a complaint or by the service of summons. Utah 
R~tles of Civil Proced~tre, Rule 3 (.a). The Federal rulA3 
provide that an action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 3. The Federal Court action was necessarily com-
menced by the filing of the complaint and it is that date 
which is critical in determining the question of privity 
and not the service of process or the date of adjudic.a-
tion. It is interesting to note the comment in 1 Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Barron and Holtzoff, Section 
161 at page 270 : 
"The necessity and importance of the rule is 
obvious. The time of commencing the action de-
tennines whether it is prematurely brought or 
whether by reason of delay it is barred by limi ta-
tions or laches, or which of two eourts first ac-
quired jurisdiclion and therefore should retain 
the case for disposition, or in some cases whether 
after-accruing claims and defenses may be liti-
gated." (Emphasis added). 
The same proposition is stated in 1Freeman on Judg-
ments, Fifth Edition, Section -1--tO at page 966: 
"Judgment Against Predecessor After Tr.ans-
fer. -It is well understood, however, though not 
always so stated in express terms, that no one is 
privy to a judgment whose succession to the rights 
of property thereby affected, occurred previously 
to the institution of the suit. No alienee, grantee, 
assignee or mortgagee is bound or affected by a 
judgment or decree in a suit commenced by or 
against the alienor, grantor, .assignor or mortga-
gor, subsequent to the alienation, grant, assign-
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ment or mortgage, to which he was not a party. 
The critical date in determining the question 
of a purchaser's privity is the commencement of 
the suit rather than the date of the adjudication, 
except that this may be affected by statutes gov-
erning lis pendens." 
The question is necessarily raised as to what effect 
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has on the question 
here involved. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act was not 
designed to give a party any greater property rights than 
before the passage of the Act. It is merely a procedural 
rule affecting the transfer of stock and is principallY 
effective between the parties. While the purpose is to 
give the stock some of the incidents of negotiability, it 
does not go so far as to change a stockholder's relation-
ship with the corporation. The extent of negotiability 
and the effect of the Uniforn1 Stock Transfer Act wa~ 
before the court in [Tntermyer et al. r. State Tax Com-
mission et al., 102 lTtah ~14, 129 P. 2d 881: 
.. Counsel argue that since the rnifonn Stock 
Transfer Act permits attachment or levy of ex-
ecution on stock onlv bv seizure of the certifi-
cate, the stock or inte~est" of the stockholder in the 
corporation does not exist independent of the 
certificate. Therefore it can have no situs except 
the situs of the certifieate. The certificate thus 
actually becomes the }Jroperty, and not the eri-
deuce or proof of ownership thereof. Such is not 
the im1wrt of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 
It does not clwll.(/C the nature of stock Olcwnerslzip 
or stockholders' riphts. as far as the state or the 
corporation is concerned. That Act relates solely 
to methods of transferriug title to stock either by 
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act of the owner, or by legal process. * * * It is 
simply a procedural statute dealing with ,the 
methods and processes of determining or obtain-
ing title to the stock." (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiff, notwithstanding the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act, could acquire no greater right nor any 
better title than his transferor. "\Vhile the trial court 
found that the plaintiff had no knowledge of any in-
firmity or of any court action involving the action, it did 
not specifically find that the plaintiff herein was not in 
privity with the defendant in the Federal Court suit. 
The question of notice is immaterial if, as defendants 
contend herein, the plaintiff was bound as a privy by 
the prior judgment. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
DEFECT IN TITLE OF THE STOCK OR THAT THE SALE 
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IMPUTE 
NOTICE OF THE DEFECT. 
While defendants realize that they are faced with 
an adverse finding of fact by the trial court on the ques-
tion of notice, they take the position that the testimony 
of the plaintiff and the witnesses Cuthbert and Lowe 
are not worthy of belief. From the decisions heretofore 
handed down by this Court it would appear that whether 
or not it is to be bound by a finding of fact depends upon 
the circumstances of each case, contrary to the oft-stated 
rule that a finding wjll not be disturbed if there is any 
evidence to support it. 
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The factual premise and the circumstances surround-
ing the srale made it impossible to prove actual notice. 
Cuthbert and Lowe had knowledge of all of the facts 
relating to the stock certificate and were legal counsel 
for Migliaccios and the good friend of the plaintiff N"oke~-;. 
It was testified that they did not inform X okes of any 
defect in relation to the stock prior to the transfer, but 
within two hours thereafter informed plaintiff of the 
dispute relating to the stock. It seems indisputable that 
Cuthbert and Lowe were acting as the agent of both 
parties, giving their friend an opportunity to buy valu-
able stock and making it possible for their client to get 
rid of what ultilnately proved to be an adverse lawsuit. 
If knowledge of defects were not nnputed to the plain-
tiff under the fact situation, it is inconceivable what man-
ner of situation 1nust be created to in1pute knowledge. 
The rule is stated in An1erican Jurisprudence as follows: 
"X otice given to an agent en1ployed to pur-
chase property. of any defect in the title to, or 
quality of the property, is notice to his principal, 
in any controversy between hun and the vendor 
in relation to such property. Accordingly, it is 
('V<'r~·where conceded that a purchaser is bound 
and affected by the knowledge or notice of an 
agent purchasing the property of prior liens, 
trn~t~. or frnnds, which knowledge or notice the 
agPnt obtains in negotiating the particular trans-
netion. The p;PnPrnl rule is also applied as to no-
tieP, aeqnin•d hy the ng()nt. of one who claims to 
lw a bona fide purchaser." ~ Am. Jur .. Section 
:rn . p.agp :291. 
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POINT III. 
THE SALE WAS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. 
In spite of the difficulty relating to proof of actual 
notice, it is the contention of the defendant that the plain-
tiff was not a purchaser in good faith. The court made 
the finding that there were no facts adduced that, by 
reasonable diligence, plaintiff should have known of any 
adverse claim. The promise of fantastic profits in uran-
ium stock, not traded, should have been a warning to 
any purchaser. In this case the plaintiff testified that 
he knew that the stock was not traded on the market and, 
in spite of the representation that he could purchase for 
$500.00 stock having a hook value of over $7000.00, the 
court found that there was no circumstance that would 
put plaintiff on notice of a defect. 
Good faith has been the subject of many definitions 
but it universally encompasses an honest intent, an ab-
sence of malice or design to defraud or seek unconscion-
able advantage. It has also been said that to constitute 
good faith there must not only be an absence, not alone 
of participation in the fraud or collusion with the vendor, 
but also of knowledge or even notice of the fraud or of 
facts and circumstances calculated to put an ordinarily 
prudent business man on inquiry so that he would as-
certain the truth. 
"To constitute 'good faith', there must not 
only be an absence, not alone of participation in 
the fraud or collusion with the vendee, but also of 
knowledge or even notice of the fraud, or of facts 
and circumstances calculated to put an ordinarily 
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prudent businessman on inquiry, so that he would 
ascertain the truth. Thus, where it appeared that 
a purchaser of stock had suspicions relating to 
the sale of it, he cannot be said to be a purchaser 
in good faith. Siano v. Helvering, D. C. N. J., 
13 F. Supp. 776, 780." Words and Plvrases, Vol. 
18, page 495. 
Fr01n the record it would appear that the plaintiff 
was an ordinarily prudent business man. His employ-
ment would indicate at least that, and, while being a law-
yer might negative the idea of business judgment, it does 
not appear in the record that he claimed any such in-
firmity. 
While the defendant herein is faced with the finding 
as to notice, it is more fortunate on the question of good 
faith. X o finding was made to the effect that the plain-
tiff was a purchaser in good faith. It would seem strange, 
under the circumstances, that the plaintiff should not be 
charged with at least making the nominal effort of a 
local telephone call to inquire about the stock. If the 
conduct of plaintiff wrrs not for the purpose of collud-
ing to gain an unconscionable advantage, why such a cal-
culated effort to talk about everything except the wrong 
things. "rh~· wa~ it neeessar:· for Cuthbert to adjourn 
to another office to call )[ igliaccio and why didn't he 
inforin plaintiff of the conversation. In response to the 
qtwstion wh:· he (li(ln•t tell Xokes about the conversation 
with l\l igliaeeio. Cuthbert answ·ered: .. I didn•t believe 
thPr<' wa~ nn:,thing wrong with the stoek. ·· (R. 49). 
BPe.ansP Cuthbert did not telJ Xnkes about his con-
YPr~atioll with l\1 igliaccio for the reason that he didn't 
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believe there was anything wrong with the stock, he was 
asked if his statement to Migliaccio "that it was a sure 
bet he wouldn't be able to do anything with that stock 
without litigation" was the truth. l-Ie .answered that it 
was. If one is to take the answers as the truth, the only 
result is a calculated atte1npt by Cuthbert and Lowe to 
seek an unconsciomible advantage in which the plaintiff 
must be regarded .as a participant. 
POINT IV. 
THAT BY STATUTE THE TRANSFER WAS NOT VALID 
AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION UNTIL IT WAS REG-
ISTERED UPON THE BOOKS OF THE CORPORATION. 
As has been previously noted above, the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act is a procedural device and does not 
change the nature of the stockholders' ownership or 
rights so far as the corporation is concerned. Cntcrmyer 
et al v. State Ta.r Commission et al., supra. 
The defendant takes the position that the transfer 
from Migliaccio to Nokes did not bind the corporation 
until such time as the transfer was registered on rthe 
books of the corporation. Rection 1617, Ne1'wla CoJ/1-
piled Laws 1929 as amended, provides: 
"* * * No transfer of stoek shall be valid 
against the corporation until it shall have been 
registered upon the books of the corporation." 
epon presentation of the stock eertificate to the J>rpsi-
dent of the eorporation plaintiff \\~as informed of the 
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corporation'~ clairn. The plaintiff had acquired no rights 
as against the corporation at the time plaintiff w.as in-
formed of its claim. The refusal to transfer was the only 
method by which the corporation could protect its rights 
and the rights of other stockholders, and upon the refusal 
to transfer the plaintiff was left with an adequate remedy 
against his transferor and, by reason of the statute, had 
no right to con1pel the corporation to make the transfer. 
Any other construction would leave the corporation and 
the stockholders with a right but no remedy to safeguard 
its interests. The corporation's rights could be defeated 
hy successive transfers. The above statute has been con-
strued by b\·o XeYada cases, Bereich t·. JJarye, 9 Xe,·. 
316, and Double 0 Jlining Co. 1:. Simrak_. 132 P. :2d 605. 
The latter c.ase held: 
•·A transfer of stock between individuals, in 
order to receiYe recognition by the corporation, 
n1ust be registered upon its books: however, if 
not so registered, the transfer is binding upon the 
parties, and the equitable title, at least, passes. 
Further, as between individuals, a registration 
upon the corporate books n1ust be n1ade in order 
that the transferee maY be entitled to exercise 
voting po\n'r. In re ..-\.1:gns Printing Co .. 1 X.D. 
-t:~-t. -t~ X."T· :-3-t/, 1~ L.H.~~. ISl. ~6 ~~m. St. Rep. 
639, ()-t/: ~Tt•rrhants Xational Bank Y. \Yehrmann, 
~0~ l ·.s. :2~)5, :2G S. Ct. ()1;-L 50 L. Ed. 1036, 1040; 
G Fleteher, Corp .. 6339, Section 3796 and n. 19." 
A :-;imilnr Cnlifornia statute has been construed in Realtp 
& llclmildinp Co. r. Rca et al. (Cal.), :2~-! P. 1020: 
"The general rule is that a transferor is not 
released frOin thh~ unposed burden until his trans-
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fer is duly registered upon the corporate books. 
Our Code provides in substance thaA; a transfer 
is not valid, except as to the parties thereto, until 
the same is entered upon the books of the cor-
poration so as to show the name of the parties by 
whom and to whom the transfer was made, the 
number of the certificate, the number of designa-
tion of the shares, and the date of the trransfer. 
Civ. Code, Sec. 324. This statute is mandatory, 
and not directory, and is not a mere rule for 
guidance of the corporation and stockholder. The 
section Inakes the transfer invalid, except as be-
tween the parties thereto, unless it is made in 
conformity with this statutory requirement. The 
transfer of shares of stock, therefore to become 
effectual between transferor and creditors of the 
corporation, must be entered on the corporate 
books. Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 113 Cal. 272, 
45 Pac. 329, 33 L.R.A. 459, 54 Am. St. Rep. 348. 
A provision of this character is .a formality in-
tended for the protection and security of the cor-
poration and of third persons dealing with the 
same. Creditors of a corporation have a right 
to rely upon the books as showing who the stock-
holders are and the amount of stock held by each, 
and failure to m.ake a transfer on the books of 
the corporation requires that such transfer must 
be disregarded in considering the rights of credi-
tors. Sherman v. S.K.D. Oil Co., 185 Cal. 534, 
548, 197 Pac. 799 and cases cited." 
It is also of importance to note that the request for 
transfer was made to :Jfr. Frawley. There is no evidencP-
in the record that it was made in the office of the de-
fendant corporation, and the plaintiff testified that he 
did not present the stock certificate to the Transfer 
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Agent. The books of the defendant corporation are by 
law required to be at its principal place of business in 
Nevada, the only place where the transfer could lawfully 
be made. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should 
be reversed. 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, hl.ATTSSOK 
& EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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